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The State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") submits its 
Appellant's brief as follows: 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 3, 2006, Claimant was working alone when he was struck on his hardhat 
by a falling tree. Claimant's employee had previously cut the tree that hit Claimant, but 
left it standing. The draft created by a tree Claimant had just fallen apparently knocked 
the standing tree loose and Claimant ran into it. A nearby stump prevented the tree from 
crushing Claimant. When he came to, Claimant wriggled out from under the tree. 
His legs were tingling and numb. He couldn't lift his chainsaw. He made his way to 
his pickup and drank a soda. When he tried to walk, he knew he had seriously injured 
himself. "I was clumsy and my legs were like - - it was like, I'm done." (TR, pp. 102-
103.) Claimant drove to the emergency department at Benewah Community Hospital in 
St. Maries. 
Following care and treatment by other physicians, and an IME by Dr. Stevens at 
Surety's behest, Mr. Green returned to see Dr. Dirks. Mr. Green had previously seen 
Dr. Dirks in 2004. 
Dr. Dirks and his nurse practitioner first saw Claimant regarding this injury on 
September 18, 2006. Claimant reported long-standing pain and numbness in his right 
heel, for which he was taking Neurontin, as well as details concerning his industrial 
accident. He had some neck and elbow pain, and back pain, and he and problems with 
his left leg. Dr. Dirks' nurse practitioner diagnosed neck pain without radiculopathy 
("He does have a disc bulge at CS-6, but this does not seem to be clinically significant 
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with ciprofloxacin. On April 17, 2007, Dr. Dirks referred Claimant for physical therapy. 
On May 17, Dr. Dirks reported Claimant was doing fine in regard to his back, but he still 
had "complaints of leg pain from before and he has low back pain." JE-103. On exam, 
Claimant had good leg strength and was walking. Also, "He has right-sided neck pain 
that goes into the right arm and makes it feel like jelly:" with right deltoid, triceps, and 
biceps weakness on exam. 
Dr. Dirks ordered a new cervical spine MRI, performed on May 23, 2007. The 
images demonstrated motion; however, the radiologist reported they revealed bony 
changes at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6, as well as "moderate narrowing of the bilateral C3-
C4 neuroforamen and moderate narrowing of the C5-C6 right neural fora men." JE-104. 
On June 7, 2007, Claimant continued to have pain in his neck and down his right arm 
"since his accident." JE-106. Claimant explained that previously, when he had neck 
pain, he could alleviate it by lying on a rolled-up towel. After his 2006 industrial injury, 
however, this procedure provided no relief. "If I lay on that towel now with stenosis, or 
whatever is going on in there now, I can't - - everything goes numb." 2007 Cl. Dep., pp. 
26-27. 
Upon review of the latest MRI, Dr. Dirks opined Claimant's neck and right arm 
complaints were the result of a "right, greater than left, radicular component correlating 
with a C5-6 disk bulge on the right." JE-110. Dr. Dirks recommended an anterior 
cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6 with plating and cadaver bone. He attributed the 
need for surgery to the 2006 industrial injury. 
On July 16, 2007, Claimant underwent cervical fusion surgery, at C5-6, with 
Dr. Dirks. A week later, Claimant sought stronger pain medication from Dr. Dirks for 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3 
3. T12-L 1 fusion; 
4. Preexisting multi-level cervical and lumbar disc disease and spinal 
degeneration. 
The case was set for hearing in August of 2012. The Amended Notice of 
Hearing set forth the issues to be heard and decided by the Commission. 
Notably for this appeal, the issues included: 
1. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing 
and/or subsequent injury/condition; 
2. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a. Medical care; 
b. Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits 
(TPD/TTD); 
c. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
d. Permanent partial disability in excess of impairment, including total 
permanent disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine; and 
e. Attorney fees; 
3. Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled; 
4. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-406 is appropriate; 
5. Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code 
§72-332; and 
6. Apportionment under the Carey formula. 
The case was heard by Referee Rind a Just, who retired prior to issuing 
recommended findings and conclusion. The case was taken over by the full 
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3. Whether the Commission erred in relieving Employer/Surety from its 
failure to prove the elements of ISIF liability, which such issues were clearly noticed for 
hearing. 
4. Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant's thoracic spine condition 
"combined with" the industrial injuries to render Claimant totally and permanently 
disabled is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
5. Whether the Commission erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
Claimant suffered from a permanent pre-existing physical impairment within the 
meaning of I.C. § 72-332(2) when no physician had assigned an impairment rating prior 
to the hearing for Claimant's thoracic spine condition. 
6. Whether the Commission erred in applying the Carey Formula when at 
hearing there was no evidence of any impairment rating for Claimant's thoracic spine 
condition. 
Ill. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
This is a worker's compensation case involving the ISIF. The preliminary 
decision of the Commission was styled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order" and was filed January 29, 2014. (R. pp.66-181 ). 
One of the statutory elements necessary to establish ISIF liability is that a 
Claimant must suffer from a permanent pre-existing physical impairment. I.C. §72-332. 
It must then also be shown that such pre-existing condition qualified for an impairment 
rating---a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of such physical impairment. I.C. 
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The ISIF respectfully submits that the Commission erred in retaining jurisdiction 
to fill in the lack of requisite evidence by a sua sponte method under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. The ISIF further submits that to the extent the Industrial 
Commission possessed discretion to retain jurisdiction, that such discretion was 
abused. Additionally, the ISIF maintains that the decision to retain jurisdiction sua 
sponte was an attempt at some equitable result-a realm in which the Commission 
cannot operate, 1 - and was made in violation of all legal standards governing the 
Commission's discretion to retain jurisdiction. 
The preliminary and interlocutory decision entered January 29, 2014 was 
followed up by the "Order on ISIF Liability" filed November 26, 2014 (R. pp.200-207). In 
this Order the Commission found a numerical rating for the pre-existing thoracic spine 
condition and proceeded to apply the Carey formula to apportion liability between the 
Surety and the ISIF. The ISIF appeals from both decisions. 
Prior to the Order of November 26, 2014, the ISIF filed its "Brief on Retained 
Jurisdiction" (R. Additional Documents #6). The ISIF argued, inter alia, that (1) the 
interlocutory order to retain jurisdiction was entered in error and was an abuse of 
discretion; (2) there was not substantial competent evidence to support the finding of 
combination under I.C. §72-332; and (3) the sua sponte attempt to relieve the surety 
from its failure of proof on a noticed issue worked a "manifest injustice" upon the ISIF. 
The ISIF argued that the interlocutory sua sponte decision to retain jurisdiction 
should be revisited and rescinded as improvidently granted. This was done for the 
1 Deon v. H&J Inc., Liberty Northwest and /SIF, 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014). The court did not 
delve into the issue of whether some variant of judicial estoppel obtains in worker's compensation cases, 
but did observe: "that the Commission derives its authority solely from statutory law and does not have 
the ability to operate in the equitable realm." 
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so sua sponte to keep the record open for any additional evidence or other issues. 
Following the completion of the post-hearing depositions, the Employer/Surety made no 
motion to the Commission requesting that it retain jurisdiction. When all of the facts 
were fully submitted, and the record completed, the Employer/Surety had not, at any 
time, requested that the Commission retain jurisdiction in order that "justice" be 
achieved. 
Two days after the Commission entered its final order, this Court issued its 
opinion in Deon v. H &J Inc. and ISIF, 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014). The court 
considered another sua sponte "result" by the Commission after applying a legal theory 
not raised by the parties and deciding an issue which had not been noticed or presented 
before the Commission. The court in Deon held and stated that: 
"As demonstrated by our decisions in Sa/es and Heitz, this Court 
takes a dim view of fact-finding tribunals raising defenses or 
theories sua sponte. Theories and defenses should be 
determined by the parties, not the tribunal. Just as in Sa/es, 
where we held it was error for the district court to raise an 
affirmative defense not raised by the parties, the Commission 
erred here in raising collateral estoppel, which was never 
raised by Employer/Surety before the Commission invited 
briefing on the issue. Although Employer/Surety may not have 
known the complete substance of the ISIF agreement, there is 
no question it knew ISIF had settled with Deon and therefore 
knew ISIF had accepted some level of liability to Deon. 
Despite this knowledge, either intentionally or by oversight, 
Employer/Surety chose not to raise estoppel theories as a 
defense to Deon's claim. In Heitz, we held that a party is bound by 
the theory upon which it tries its case. We cannot speak to the 
reasons Employer/Surety failed to assert estoppel, but just as in 
Sales and Heitz, Employer/Surety is held to that choice. The 
Commission cannot raise the defense of collateral estoppel for 
Employer/Surety even if it felt Employer/Surety would have 
prevailed had it chosen to raise the issue. Our system works best 
when the parties devise their own litigation strategies." 
Id at p. 674. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11 
abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which 
abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at the time of 
evaluation." 
In the landmark decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Carey v. 
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,112,686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984), the 
court had before it conflicting decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission reaching 
different results in apportioning liability between the Employer/Surety and the ISIF in the 
three cases. The court made it clear in its decision that a uniform rule of law in applying 
the statute needed to be imposed in cases involving the ISIF in order to achieve 
consistency and clarity for the parties and the Commission. In crafting that judicial 
solution, which has been "black letter law" in all ISIF cases before this Commission for 
over 30 years, the court stated: 
We believe that the appropriate solution to the problem of 
apportioning the nonmedical disability factors, in an odd-lot case 
where the fund is involved, is to prorate the nonmedical portion of 
disability between the employer and the fund, in proportion to their 
respective percentages of responsibility for the physical 
impairment. Thus, in the instant case, Mr. Carey's preexisting 
impairment was 10% of the whole man, and his physical 
impairment from the accident is an additional 40%, resulting in a 
50% impairment. Claimant is 100% disabled, by virtue of the odd-
lot doctrine, so an additional 50% nonmedical factors, over and 
above the 50% physical impairment, need to be allocated 
between the employer/surety and the fund. The fund is therefore 
responsible for 10/50, or 4/5 (80%) [sic], of the nonmedical portion 
of disability, and the employer is liable for 40/50, or 4/5 (80%), of 
the nonmedical factors. In accord are Northwest Carriers v. 
Industrial Comm 'n, 639 P .2d 183 ( Utah 1981 ); and Des bi an v. 
Key Milling Co., Inc., 588 P.2d 482 (Kan. 1979). The Utah 
Supreme Court explained this proration method in the Northwest 
Carriers case, supra, 639 P.2d at 141-142: 
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parties notice of the issues to be decided in any given case. As in Vawter, the issue of 
apportionment under the Carey formula was clearly set forth in the Amended Notice of 
Hearing in this case. Furthermore, the parties were on notice that the Commission 
would hear evidence regarding and presumably determine all factual and legal issues 
related to apportionment, including application of the Carey formula. As the court 
further noted in Vawter, supra, "evaluation of permanent impairment is conducted 
through a rating analysis, expressed as a percentage." (Id. p. 7) Yet despite being 
clearly noticed as an issue in this case, and despite the decision in Carey, supra, 
predicating apportionment upon numerical impairment ratings, and despite the 
representation of Employer/Surety by experienced counsel, the Commission has 
relieved the Employer/Surety from its failure to present any impairment rating regarding 
the Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition. If the Employer/Surety, having 
notice of the issue, having notice of the elements of proof required, and yet fails to 
present evidence on such issues, is to be relieved of such failure by the concept of 
"retained jurisdiction", then in what conceivable case would retained jurisdiction not 
likewise be applicable to insulate and protect Employer/Surety from its own failure of 
proof? Why in this case should the Industrial Commission relieve Employer/Surety of 
the certain consequences of its failure to present the requisite proof? Why should the 
Industrial Commission give to the Employer/Surety a second opportunity, under the 
notion of retained jurisdiction, to adduce the very "evaluation of permanent impairment" 
that was required under the noticed issues for hearing and extant law? The 
Commission in its preliminary decision indicated that it is doing so from the demands of 
justice. 
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knowledge of lay persons. Id. p. 758. The court further held that: "An agency 'may not 
use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for evidence presented at a hearing"'. Id. 
761. The court held that, in making findings of fact, the Commission must take an 
independent role as an adjudicator, must listen to the testimony of experts, and must 
render an impartial decision based upon the evidence in the record and the law... Id. 
761. 
In this case, the Industrial Commission entered as a conclusion of law the 
following: 
287. The Commission concludes that Claimant is likely entitled to 
an impairment rating referable to the T12-L 1 fusion and residuals. 
However, the record altogether fails to establish what that 
impairment rating might be. (R. p.167) 
In so doing, the Industrial Commission proceeded to a legal conclusion that the 
Claimant was "likely entitled to an impairment rating referable to the T12-L 1 fusion and 
residuals." However, the statute clearly provides that an appropriate impairment rating 
is "a medical appraisal". There was "no medical appraisal" in this record. Despite such 
lack of evidence, the Commission evidently concluded that such a medical appraisal 
was likely and therefore retained jurisdiction. The conclusion is inescapable that the 
Commission in this case intended a certain result: ISIF liability. Under the court's 
decision in Mazzone and other cases, the only way the Commission could reach such a 
result was to retain jurisdiction and allow the Employer/Surety after-the-fact to obtain the 
evidence which the Commission believed was likely. The conclusion that Claimant was 
entitled to an impairment rating, and the necessary finding upon which such conclusion 
must be based, is completely lacking in this record. There was no medical evidence 
offered at any stage in this proceeding prior to the sua sponte order retaining jurisdiction 
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"A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its 
discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) 
reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Johannsen v. 
Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,429,196 P.3d 341,347 (2008). Martin 
v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161,163,296 P.3d 367,369 (2013). 
It is illuminating to review this Court's cases regarding retained jurisdiction in 
worker's compensation proceedings. In so doing, it is clear that retained jurisdiction is 
not available to relieve a surety from failing to present evidence on a threshold legal 
issue noticed for hearing. 
In the pre-1971 code decision of Watkins v. Cavanagh and State Insurance Fund 
61 Idaho 720, 107 P .2d 155 ( 1940) the Claimant suffered injury caused by a pump 
falling onto his chest which led to traumatic pneumonia and a complication of phlebitis. 
The Industrial Accident Board determined that the Claimant had suffered from a 10% 
impairment rating of the loss of the leg. There was an issue on appeal regarding the 
failure of the board to award partial temporary disability from the period January 20, 
1938 to June 28, 1938. This was due to the fact that the Claimant overlooked 
submitting any evidence as to his average weekly wage during that 6 month period of 
time. The court held and stated that: 
In Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 
31 P.2d 683 this court held: 
"When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting 
evidence to establish the amount of compensation to which 
he is entitled, and there is no question but that he is entitled 
to [61 Idaho 726] compensation, then it is the duty of the 
Board to call attention to such failure and see to it that 
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is 
presented, and then make the necessary findings of fact." 
/dat 157. 
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The Watkins and Feu/ing cases were cited by the court in Hartman as supporting 
the notion of retained jurisdiction before the Industrial Commission. It is significant to 
note that in neither case did the Commission, on its own, or in the exercise of its 
discretion, retain jurisdiction. Rather, the court remanded the cases back to the Board 
to take additional evidence to protect the claimant and to make determination of the 
claimant's actual wages. In both cases the court clearly held and stated that the 
concept of taking new evidence after the Board's decision was only necessary to protect 
the claimant and that the Worker's Compensation Law and Board practice was to "be 
liberally construed for the benefit of those whom it is intended to protect." 
In another pre 1971 code case Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 579, 532 P.2d 921 
(1975), Claimant was injured when a loader rolled over him, crushing his pelvis. 
Claimant was found entitled to benefits and the Board ordered employer to pay medical 
expenses to the date of hearing (October 13, 1967) plus total temporary disability 
payments for a 9 month period. The Board in its rulings of law retained jurisdiction "to 
hear and determine upon appropriate supplemental pleadings from any party in interest" 
other pending issues. Some five years later, claimant wrote a letter to the Industrial 
Commission inquiring about the possibility of further benefits and in 1972 he filed a 
formal application for a hearing asking that the medical expenses for his second 
operation be paid. The Commission evidently assumed jurisdiction of the matter under 
its prior order reserving jurisdiction, but then held the claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the claim for additional medical 
benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations and neither was the claim for total 
temporary disability as a result of the second operation. The court did not discuss the 
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thereby keeping open the issue of disability for the industrial injury. On petition for 
rehearing filed by Browning Ferris, the Commission deleted any reference to retained 
jurisdiction and adhered to the impairment and disability the Commission previously 
made. A second appeal was taken by claimant, contending that the Commission erred 
on reconsideration in its refusal to retain jurisdiction. 
The court in Reynolds II (113 Idaho 965, 751 P.2d 113 (1988)) discussed the 
appropriate process for the Commission to address impairment and disability in a case 
where the claimant's condition was certain to deteriorate in the future. The court noted 
that in such a case the Commission could retain jurisdiction or it could utilize "another 
possible approach" set forth in Idaho Code §72-425. Of course that statute allows the 
Commission to determine disability in light of a claimant's "present and probable future 
ability to engage in gainful activity ... " Therefore the court remanded the case to the 
Commission and suggested that §72-425 be utilized to determine disability with a view 
toward probable future reductions in claimant's ability to be gainfully employed. 
Clearly, to the extent that Reynolds I or II support the notion of retained 
jurisdiction in a Commission case, they do so only in order to protect the claimant and 
the claimant's entitlement to future benefits. Interplay between Justices Bakes and 
Bistline and their concurring opinions (a feature common in many worker's comp cases 
in those years) discuss the utility of the retained jurisdiction concept. Justice Bakes 
noted that "our prior cases have indicated a preference for making final determinations 
of permanent disability, rather than retaining jurisdiction." Id. at 119. Justice Bistline 
launched into a review of the cases and added the following in his concurring opinion: 
"As for the case now at hand, and the tendered guidance on 
remand per the opinion for the Court and per the separate opinion 
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claimant's partial disability award to 59% of the whole man. Following the Commission 
decision, the claimant appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the Commission 
should have retained jurisdiction over issues pertaining to future medical benefits. The 
Commission refused to do so. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted the applicable 
legal standard whereby the Commission may properly retain jurisdiction: 
"In Reynolds, this Court stated: "In a situation where the 
claimant's impairment is progressive and, therefore, cannot 
adequately be determined for purposes of establishing a 
permanent disability rating, it is entirely appropriate for the 
Industrial Commission to retain jurisdiction until such time as the 
claimant's condition is nonprogressive." However, under I.C. § 
, 72-425, the Commission is allowed to make an appraisal of an 
"injured employee's present and probable future ability to 
engage in gainful activity" and base its evaluation rating upon 
that appraisal. See Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idaho 293, 766 
P.2d 763 (1988). In arriving at its disability rating of fifty-nine 
percent in this case, the Commission considered the possibility 
of future surgery to repair the total arthroplasty. Consequently, 
we conclude that the Industrial Commission did not err in 
entering a final award without retaining jurisdiction." 
Id. at 804. 
Thus, the court articulated the appropriate standard determining whether or not 
the Commission committed error in refusing to retain jurisdiction. The standard was 
whether the Commission had properly evaluated claimant's disability under Idaho Code 
§72-425. In utilizing Idaho Code §72-425, the Commission correctly refused to retain 
jurisdiction as to any issue of future disability. The holding of this case demonstrates 
that the concept of "justice" toward a surety is not even properly attributable to retained 
jurisdiction. The concept of manifest injustice arises under Idaho Code §72-719(3) and 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the concept of retained jurisdiction to benefit a 
claimant by way of future consideration of increased disability. Since the Commission 
had determined disability under §72-425, there was no legal basis under which the 
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case. The case merely stands for the proposition that retained jurisdiction is 
appropriate on issues of future determination of claimant's entitlement to impairment 
benefits and/or disability benefits. The doctrine is of no avail to a surety who fails to 
present evidence at the hearing on a noticed issue. 
In Burke v. EG & G/Morrison-Knudsen Co., 126 Idaho 413,885 P.2d 372 (1994) 
the Commission determined the claimant's percentage of permanent physical 
impairment and declined to award any disability beyond impairment. The Commission 
in its order declined to retain jurisdiction with respect to permanent future disability. The 
court on appeal held that the Commission applied the correct legal standard in 
determining impairment and disability and that the Commission applied the correct legal 
standard in declining to retain jurisdiction. The court reiterated that the appropriate legal 
standard to be applied in ruling on a request that the Commission retain jurisdiction is 
as follows: 
"In a situation where the claimant's impairment is progressive and, 
therefore, cannot adequately be determined for purposes of 
establishing a permanent disability rating, it is entirely appropriate 
for the Industrial Commission to retain jurisdiction until such time as 
the claimant's condition is non-progressive." 
(Id. at p.416, citation omitted) 
The impact of this decision is, consistent with the other cited cases, that the legal 
standard allowing the Commission to retain jurisdiction is: it is confined to a 
determination of changes in a claimant's condition and/or future disability. 
Retained jurisdiction does not lie for purposes of relieving a surety from its failure 
to present testimony and proof sufficient to apportion liability to the ISIF. 
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Industrial Commission erred in failing to retain jurisdiction. The Supreme Court once 
again cited to Reynolds II for the proposition that it would be appropriate for the 
Commission to retain jurisdiction in the case, but that there was another possible 
approach that the Commission may utilize which is set forth in Idaho Code §72-425. 
Because the Commission had proceeded to determine claimant's disability 
appropriately under §72-425, there was no basis upon which to retain jurisdiction and 
the Commission correctly determined they would not do so. The court found no error in 
the Commission's decision and no abuse of discretion. Again, the concept of retained 
jurisdiction was noted to be available in a case where the Commission was not able to 
determine the claimant's extent of disability. In the pending case, the Commission 
proceeded under §72-425 to determine that Mr. Green is totally and permanently 
disabled. Having done so, the legal standards in Idaho governing retained jurisdiction 
are fully satisfied and there is no basis for the Commission to retain jurisdiction on other 
issues. 
In Lorca-Merono v. Yokes Washington Foods, Inc. and ISIF, 137 Idaho 446, 50 
P.3d 461 (2002) there was yet another appeal by a claimant contending that the 
Commission should have retained jurisdiction to evaluate future impairments and 
disabilities. The claimant contended that the Commission should have retained 
jurisdiction over the case until she received future medical treatments and achieved an 
MMI status. The court, again citing to the legal standard adopted in Reynolds II, noted 
that retained jurisdiction would not be available because the Commission had 
determined that the claimant was MMI and that impairments were non-progressive. 
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referee or examiner, to whom the matter has been assigned, shall 
make such inquires and investigations as may be deemed 
necessary." As stated in Hagler, "none of our opinions in recent 
years have had occasion to remind the Commission of the inherent 
powers it possesses." 118 Idaho at 599, 798 P.2d at 58. Although, 
in this case, it is not the Industrial Commission we have to remind, 
but instead the parties practicing before it. 
In this case, the Industrial Commission found that Hartman 
appeared to be entitled to compensation. Apparently, the Industrial 
Commission felt that Hartman either failed to present or overlooked 
submitting evidence regarding apportionment between the 
Appellants. Clearly, the Industrial Commission has authority to 
request that Hartman present adequate evidence on this issue." 
Id. at 143. 
The above quoted portion of the court's dicta is illuminating. The initial 
paragraph notes only that retained jurisdiction from the older cases of Watkins and 
Feuling pertained to a situation where a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting 
evidence to establish the amount of compensation. 
Likewise, the final paragraph of the above quoted dicta demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court perceived the issue on retained jurisdiction to relate to the claimant's 
(Hartman) entitlement to compensation. The court's analysis demonstrates that the 
court perceived the issue as being that Hartman either failed to present or overlooked 
submitting evidence regarding apportionment. The court then noted that the Industrial 
Commission could retain jurisdiction to request that Hartman present evidence on this 
issue so as to support the claimant's entitlement to benefits. 
In no case involving retained jurisdiction has the Industrial Commission or the 
Idaho Supreme Court allowed retained jurisdiction where the issue did not relate to a 
claimant's entitlement to benefits, and in particular to a claimant's entitlement to future 
disability outside of an Idaho Code §72-425 analysis. The Commission's reliance on 
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Rehearing Denied October 29, 2014) The second prong of the Corgatelli decision dealt 
with the Employer/Surety's burden of proof in seeking to invoke the liability of ISIF under 
the "but for'' standard. This issue is entirely separate from the notion of retained 
jurisdiction. This issue is predicated upon a finding entered without substantial 
competent evidence and a conclusion thereon reached in violation of Corgatelli and 
Hope. 
This court explained the "but for" standard and held that the Industrial 
Commission had failed to correctly apply the "but for'' test. The court held that the 
Commission erred in failure to apply the correct but for test and stated that: 
"Our review of the Commission's decision reveals that the Commission 
failed to use the "but for'' test to determine whether Steel West satisfied 
the "combined effects" requirement in Idaho Code section 72-332(1 ). 
Instead of the "but for" test, Commission examined whether Corgatelli's 
preexisting impairment from his 1994 injury and his 2005 injury together 
"necessitated" the 2009 L2-5 fusion. By inferring that Corgatelli would not 
have needed the 2009 fusion from L2 to L5 had he not suffered his 1994 
injury, the Commission erroneously reasoned that Corgatelli's total and 
permanent disability after the fusion was the result of the combined effects 
of his two injuries. Put another way, the Commission erred by determining 
that Corgatelli was totally and permanently disabled due to the combined 
effects of the two injuries solely because the combined effects of the two 
injuries may have influenced the scope of the unsuccessful fusion." 
Id. at p. 301. 
It is evident that the Commission in the pending case has engaged in the same 
error. The pertinent conclusion is as follows: 
300. Therefore, per Ors. Ganz and McNulty, the fact that Claimant has a 
pre-existing T12-L-1 fusion increases the risk that he will have further 
problems from the L3-5 fusion unless he observes certain prophylactic 
limitations/restrictions. We believe this demonstrates that Claimant's pre-
existing thoracic spine condition does combine with the effects of the work 
accident to contribute to Claimant's total and permanent disability. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 33 
State, Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 80,921 P.2d 1200, 1204 (1996)). In 
other words, the party "seeking to invoke the liability of ISIF" has the burden of proof to 
meet the requirements under Idaho Code section 72-332( 1 ). See Garcia v. JR. Simplot 
Co., 115 Idaho 966, 970, 772 P.2d 173, 177 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Archer 
v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166,169,786 P.2d 557, 560(1990). 
The ISIF challenges the Commission's factual findings and legal analysis on the 
fourth requirement as it relates to Green's pre-existing T12- L 1 fusion, the "combined 
with" requirement. The thoracic surgery at T12-L 1 was the only pre-existing impairment 
that the commission found to satisfy the four requirements of I.C. § 72-332(1) and 
impose liability upon the ISIF. The evidence in this case does not does not support a 
finding that the T12-L 1 2003 surgery combined with the July 2006 industrial accident to 
render Green totally disabled. 
To satisfy the fourth requirement in Idaho Code section 72-332( 1 ), "the 'but for' 
standard is the appropriate test to determine whether the total permanent disability is 
the result of the combined effects of the preexisting condition and the work-related 
injury." Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho at 970, 772 P.2d at 177 (1989). The 
Supreme Court has reiterated the "but for" standard in subsequent cases and it is the 
controlling test for the "combining effects" requirement. Eckhart v. State, Indus. Special 
lndem. Fund, 133 Idaho 260, 264, 985 P.2d 685, 689 (1999); Bybee, 129 Idaho at 81, 
921 P.2d at 1205; Selzlerv. State, Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 124 Idaho 144,146,857 
P.2d 623, 625 (1993). The "but for'' test requires a showing by the party invoking liability 
that the claimant would not have been totally and permanently disabled but for the 
preexisting impairment. Garcia, supra. 
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2006 accident. Since there was no medical testimony that the Claimant would have 
been totally and permanently disabled but for the thoracic fusion, there is no basis for 
the Commission's findings that the fourth requirement of I .C. § 72-332( 1) the "combined 
with" requirement has been satisfied. The Commission held: 
Therefore, per Ors. Ganz and McNulty, the fact that Claimant has a 
pre-existing T12-L 1 fusion increases the risk that he will have 
further problems from the L3-5 fusion unless he observes certain 
prophylactic limitations/restrictions. We believe this demonstrates 
that Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition does combine 
with the effects of the work accident to contribute to Claimant's total 
and permanent disability. 
R. p. 107. 
The issue however, is not whether there is an increased risk of a future problem 
at the vertebrae between the T12-L 1 fusion and the L3-5 fusion; the issue is whether 
Green would not have been totally and permanently disabled but for the pre-existing 
thoracic fusion. There was no evidence that Green was totally and permanently 
disabled due to the combined effects of the prior thoracic fusion and the cervical fusion 
and two-level lumbar fusion caused by the 2006 accident. The "but for" test has not 
been met. 
The Supreme Court further elucidated the burden of proof in a "but for" case in 
Hope v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 157 Idaho __ , 338 P.3d 546 (2014), 
Opinion No. 102 (September 24, 2014) (Justices J. Jones and W. Jones, dissenting). 
The Court held and stated that: 
We have held on numerous occasions that a claimant must 
support his worker's compensation claim with medical testimony 
that has a reasonable degree of medical probability. Sykes v. C. 
P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761,764,605 P.2d 939,942 (1980). 
The medical aspects of workmen's compensation cases mean the 
cases "depend upon knowledge neither expected nor possessed by 
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CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission erroneously retained jurisdiction in this case to relieve 
a Surety from its failure to prove its case against the ISIF. To the extent Idaho law 
affords discretion to the Commission to retain jurisdiction, such discretion was abused in 
this case. Retained jurisdiction should never be utilized to relieve a Surety from a 
· patent failure to prove its case against the ISIF. 
The Industrial Commission also erroneously failed to apply the "but for" test to 
determine that Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition "combined with" the 
2006 industrial injuries to result in total and permanent disability. 
The Commission's decision should be reversed and the ISIF should be 
dismissed with prejudice from this case. Surety should bear the full liability for 
Claimant's disability. 
. Dated: May _1_, 2015 
Dated: May_J, 2015 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Thomas W. Callery 
Attorney for Appellant ISIF 
~~~ RennethLMallea 
Attorney for Appellant ISIF 
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Starr Kelso 
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 765-3260 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6261 
Attorney for Claimant/Respondent 
Eric S. Bailey 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorney for Employer/Surety/ Respondent 
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ROY J. GREEN, 
Claimant, 
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ROY GREEN d.b.a ST. JOE SALVAGE, 
Employer, 
and 
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Surety, 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
FB LED 
· JUL 3 t 2012 
JttJIJSTRfA.L COMMISSION 
Based on the telephone conference conducted by Referee Rinda Just on July 30, 2012, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the hearing scheduled for August 21 & 22, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., is 
hereby AMENDED to hear the following issues: 
1. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing and/or 
subsequent injury/condition; 
2. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a. Medical care; 
b. Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits (TPD/1TD); 
c. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
d. Permanent partial disability in excess of impairment, including total 
permanent disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine; and 
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e. Attorney fees; 
3. Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled; 
4. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-406 is appropriate; 
5. Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332; 
and 
6. Apportionment under the Carey formula. 
DATED this 3.Lday of July, 2012. 
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COEURD'ALENEID 83816-1312 
ERIC S BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701-1007 
THOMAS W CALLERY 
POBOX854 
LEWISTON ID 83501-0854 
kla 
and by regular United States mail upon: 
M&M COURT REPORTING SERVICES 
816 SHERMAN AVE #7 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
and by Email transmission: 
annie.frederick@labor.idaho.gov 
Idaho Department of Labor/St. Maries office 
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